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Abstract. The Central European countries have been constitutional democracies for two decades. They were 
created by the political and constitutional transition of 1989, which was based upon the acknowledgment of 
fundamental rights and the rule of law. Timothy Garton Ash has argued that the peaceful, negotiated regime 
changes in Central Europe established a new model of non-violent revolution. The year 1989 became the major 
historical reference point for this kind of change. However, more than twenty years later, in the light of 
antidemocratic, authoritarian and intolerant tendencies, it is far from clear whether the negotiated revolution is a 
story of success or failure. This paper first outlines the constitutional and political background of revolutionary 
transition. It shows that uneasy compromises with members of the ancien régime were an unavoidable part of the 
peaceful transition. Nevertheless, the achieved constitutional structures and rules do not prevent political 
communities from realising the full promise of democracy. Second, this analysis attempts to explore, through the 
use of examples, how the century-old historical circumstances, the social environment, and the commonly failed 
practice of constitutional institutions interact. The goal of this section is to highlight some of the differences 
between universal principles and local peculiarities, focusing particularly on the constitutional features of 
presidential aspirations, the privileges of churches and certain ethnic tensions. The way the authorities apply the 
constitution is not detached from place and time, since those authorities possess culturally and historically 
predetermined knowledge and premises. Thus, we can say that antidemocratic, authoritarian and intolerant political 
and legal tendencies are embedded in the past and present of political communities. Finally, the paper argues that 
the chances of success of liberal democracies depend significantly on extraconstitutional factors. It seems that 
Hungary is in a more depressing and dangerous period of its history than for example Poland. The future of 
Central European constitutional democracies relies on the actions of people in the countries concerned and the 
commitment of Western societies.
Keywords: Central Europe, political transition, constitution, parliamentarism, presidential system, freedom of 
religion, discrimination, Roma people
I. The promise of democracy
A quarter-century ago the Central European countries, the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Poland, were Communist regimes that could be characterised by a single-party system 
(Hungary) or a dominant-party system (Czechoslovakia and Poland) without the possibility 
of competitive elections. The common feature of these states, like any other Communist 
countries, was chronic shortage:1 an economy of shortage instead of a market economy, 
a budget deficit instead of a balanced budget, and the lack of democratic institutions rather 
than a constitutional democracy. Although constitutions formally declared fundamental 
rights, these were not legally enforceable. The constitutional structures of these states were 
not based upon the principles of separation of powers and the rule of law. Moreover, the 
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states did not ensure the independence of the judiciary or the press. And, of course, non-
governmental organisations were forced by the repressive regimes to work underground.
Today, the Central European countries, the so-called Visegrád Group,2 belong to the 
class of constitutional democracies. This term refers to a set of political institutions and 
practices:3 notably, members of the legislature are selected through periodically held free 
elections. The vast majority of the nation’s adult population has the right to vote regardless 
of race, gender or property ownership. The states’ constitutions contain enforceable legal 
provisions rather than a collection of mere good wishes. The purpose of constitutions is 
seen as limiting the authority of state power. Each of these constitutions recognises and 
protects judicial independence, freedom of the press and the right to establish civil 
associations. There are constitutional courts–or in Poland, a Tribunal–hat safeguard the 
observance of constitutional regulations and strike down unconstitutional laws.4 Judicial 
protection of the constitution in all countries is closer to the centralized German model than 
to the diffuse U.S. judicial review.
The historical turning point for the transformation from authoritarian regime to 
democracy was the autumn of 1989. Timothy Garton Ash described the events with the 
expression “refolution”, combining the term of reform and revolution.5 Other authors label 
the developments as “coordinated transition”,6 or “negotiated revolution”.7 Moreover, the 
dissolution of the federal state of Czechoslovakia and the establishment of the Czech 
Republic and the Slovak Republic, which took place in 1993, is often mentioned as “Velvet 
Divorce”, a reference to the term “Velvet Revolution” that was used internationally to 
describe the 1989 revolution8 (the Slovaks used the term “Gentle Revolution”). These 
classifications all express that the Central European single-party systems did not collapse 
2 The Visegrad Group consists of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of 
Poland and the Slovak Republic. The name comes from the Northern Hungarian town of Visegrad, 
which hosted the royal summit of the Central European emperors in the 14th century. The group was 
established during a meeting of the President of Czechoslovakia, Václav Havel, the Prime Minister of 
Hungary, József Antall, and the President of Poland, Lech Wałęsa, which was held in Visegrád in 
1991. The main reasons for the cooperation stem not only from the geographical closeness of these 
countries but also from their common interests in the future development of Central Europe within the 
EU and the transatlantic relations.
3 Kis, J.: Constitutional Democracy. Budapest–New York, 2003, ix, xiv.
4 From theoretical and critical point of view see Sadurski, W.: Rights before Courts: A Study of 
Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central and Eastern Europe. Dordrecht, 2005. See 
also Schwartz, H.: The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe. Chicago–
London, 2000; Procházka, R.: Mission Accomplished: On Founding Constitutional Adjudication in 
Central Europe. Budapest–New York, 2002.
5 Ash, T. G.: Refolution, the Springtime of Two Nations. The New York Review of Books, 
36 (1989) 10; Ash, T. G.: Revolution in Hungary and Poland. The New York Review of Books, 36 
(1989) 13.
6 Kis, J.: Between Reform and Revolution. East European Politics and Society, 12 (1998) 2, 
300–383. 
7 tőkés, R. L.: Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution: Economic reform, social change and political 
succession, 1957–1990. Cambridge, 1996.
8 But see the birth of the Czech Constitution from a critical point of view. Gümplova, P.: 
Democracy and the Politics in Extraordinary: The Constitutional Making in Czechoslovakia. 1992. 
www.newschool.edu/uploadedFiles/NSSR/Departments_and_Faculty/Political_Science/Recent_
Placements/Gümplova-Democracy_Extraordinary.pdf
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due to a classical revolution, but through negotiations and compromises between the old 
regime and the democratic opposition. However, the political transition did result in 
revolutionary changes in the political and constitutional system and did so without a 
revolution as such.9
In his new evaluation, Ash presupposes that the peaceful, negotiated regime changes in 
Central Europe together with unification of Germany and disintegration of the Soviet Union 
established a new model of non-violent revolution. The ideal type of classical revolution is 
“violent, utopian, professedly class-based, and characterized by a progressive radicalization, 
culminating in terror”. “The 1989 ideal type, by contrast, is non-violent, anti-utopian, based 
not on a single class but on broad social coalitions, and characterized by the application of 
mass social pressure–“people power”–to bring the current power holders to negotiate. It 
culminates not in terror but in compromise. If the totem of 1789-type revolution is the 
guillotine that of 1989 is the round table.”10 
Without doubt, the negotiation was a process led not by the common interests of the 
parties, but by a clash of values and interests, in which both parties, the Communists and 
the Democratic movements, were compelled to make compromises. We can say that the 
demand to reach compromises is one of the underlying characteristics of peaceful transitions. 
A well-known example is that in the first Polish elections 65 percent of the parliamentary 
seats were secured by the Communists, and the position of President of the Republic was 
also shaped to suit their expectations. Due to the rapidly changing political environment, 
the Hungarian opposition was forced to make much smaller compromises. In order to 
incorporate those modern constitutional principles and rules into the Constitution that were 
strongly favoured by the opposition, it was impossible to exclude the representatives of the 
old regime from political power and economic advantages. Moreover, not only pragmatic 
motives but also principled reasons underlay the absence of mass revenges. That is to say 
the legal guarantees of the new constitutional democracies were extended to everyone, 
irrespective of which side they had taken. The Hungarian Constitutional Court called this 
“a revolution under the rule of law”.11
Consequently, the new democracies faced a double, seemingly paradoxical task: they 
had to explore the legal and moral difference between the old and the new regime, and 
make clear beyond doubt that they did not place the representatives of the old regime at a 
legal disadvantage unacceptable in a state under the rule of law. It is striking that after the 
transition the Central European countries faced the same legal and political questions, 
applied similar constitutional principles and rules, and operated identical procedures. 
Although the solutions were sometimes different, the procedures dealing with the 
Communist heritage were basically determined by Parliaments and Constitutional Courts 
reacting to each other’s activity, occasionally fighting with each other. The most significant 
issues include the rehabilitation and compensation of the victims of the Communist regimes’ 
    9 János Kis characterises the coordinated transition as an interruption of legitimacy, but 
continuity of legality. Kis, J.: Between Reform and Revolution. op. cit. 317. See also from the critical 
point of view of democratic theory, Arato, A.: Dilemmas arising from the Power to Create Constitutions 
in Eastern Europe. In: Rosenfeld, M. (ed.):  Constitutionalism, Difference, Identity, and Legitimacy. 
Durham, 1994, 165–194. 
10 Ash, T. G.: Velvet Revolution: The Prospects. The New York Review of Books, 56 (2009) 19.
11 Decision 11/1992. See Sólyom, L.–Brunner, G. (eds): Constitutional Judiciary in a New 
Democracy: The Hungarian Constitutional Court. Ann Arbor, 2000, 214.
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punitive measures, the restitution of the unjustly nationalised properties, the use of 
retroactive sanctions of criminal justice, and the disclosure of the secret services’ files.
In this respect the transition in Central Europe seems to be finished. The uneasy 
compromises with members of the ancien régime were an intrinsic, unavoidable part of the 
negotiated revolution. The non-violent but drastic change created political and legal 
institutions akin to those already existing in the established liberal democracies. In 
comparison with the speedy political transformation, the texts of the constitutions were 
changed progressively. In the aftermath of the Polish Round Table Agreement, the old 
constitution was amended in April 1989, and the first democratic parliament then reshaped 
the relations between the legislative and executive branches of the State (“Small 
Constitution”). The reformed constitution was finally replaced in 1997 by a completely new 
constitution for Poland. The constitution of Czechoslovakia was also amended several times 
between 1989 and 1992. The most important of these is the incorporation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms in 1991. After the dissolution of the federal state, 
the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic adopted a new constitution in 1992. However, 
the Fundamental Rights Charter remained a part of both constitutional systems. In the Czech 
Republic the separate document has the same legal rank as the constitution. In Slovakia the 
basic provisions of the Charter were integrated directly into the constitution. By contrast, 
Hungary is the only nation that did not adopt an entirely new constitution after the fall of 
Communism. Similarly to the other countries in the region, the 1989–1990 amendments of 
the old text created the legal frameworks of the new constitutional democracy. Since the 
transition, the Constitution has been amended several times, including the modification that 
empowered Hungary to join the European Union.
Since the models of the reshaped Central European constitutions were international 
human rights instruments, as well as the more recent Western constitutions, they were 
written in the language of modern constitutionalism. As regards the constitutional principles, 
the institutional architecture and the language of the constitutional reasoning, each Central 
European country belongs to the community of modern liberal democracies. (This is why 
Ash calls the Central European revolutions non-utopian.)
Nevertheless, I share the view that law in a constitutional democracy is an interpretive 
concept influencing the everyday life of the members of the political community, rather 
than a catalogue of rules.12 Law and, especially constitutional law, is a practice of the 
political community. The Constitutional Court, other legal authorities (the Parliament, the 
President of the Republic, ordinary courts, ombudspersons etc.), petitioners and others are 
participants in that common practice. The way a constitutional court examines the text of a 
constitution depends on place and time. The justices possess culturally and historically 
predetermined pieces of knowledge and premises (“pre-judices”).13 In the course of deciding 
cases these preconceptions enter into dialogue with the norms. Thus, interpretation is 
embedded in the everyday life of the political community. On the one hand, it is so because 
the social environment provides the preconditions of interpretation; on the other, 
interpretation shapes communal practice. 
12 Here I follow Dworkin’s conception of law as integrity. Dworkin, R.: Law’s Empire. Oxford, 
1998, 226, 410–413.
13 Here I refer to Gadamer’s hermeneutic conception. Gadamer, H.-G.: Truth and Method. New 
York, 1975.
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In the following analysis I show, via Central European examples, how the century-old 
historical circumstances, the social environment, and the commonly failed practice of the 
constitutional institutions interact. The words of the Constitution are inseparable from the 
social context to which those words refer.
II. Universal principles and local peculiarities
Universal values and principles are the foundations of constitutional democracies. Individual 
rights and political equality are worthy of being pursued worldwide. In the modern era, the 
constitutional institutions of democracy enjoy widespread acceptance. Since their peaceful 
transition, Central European countries have been ensuring liberty, equality and collective 
self-government much more than before. This means a transition from an authoritarian to a 
democratic regime, from dominance of communist ideology to a pluralistic society. 
However, universal values and principles conflict with particular interests, nationalist 
aspirations and theoretical conceptions of political realism. I focus here particularly on the 
constitutional issues of presidential ambitions, the privileges of churches and ethnic 
discrimination because these issues may represent well the common constitutional 
difficulties and prosperities of the Visegrád countries.
1. Presidential ambitions
It is generally believed that a constitutional democracy may take various, equally reputable 
institutional forms. It may be a monarchy, such as Japan and Spain, or a republic like 
France. It may have a presidential (United States) or a parliamentary system (United 
Kingdom). It may be a federal (Germany) or a unitary state (South Africa). Nonetheless, 
some theorists argue that presidential systems have difficulties sustaining democratic 
practices. We might say that under a range of cultural and social conditions, a parliamentary 
regime is better than a presidential one. Depending on political traditions and culture, the 
electoral system and the prerogatives of the other branches of the state, presidentialism 
might slip into authoritarianism.14
The new Central European democracies followed Western European solutions in 
establishing adapted parliamentary systems instead of importing a U.S. presidential 
architecture.15 In this respect, the Hungarian Constitution copies the German Chancellor-led 
system with a weak president elected by the parliamentary representatives. The Czech and 
the Slovak Constitutions determine similarly that the Prime Minister heads the executive 
and the Cabinet is the supreme body of that branch.16 The Polish Constitution embodies, to 
some extent, a different system, whereby the popularly elected President and the Government 
jointly head the executive branch.
In spite of this, several scope-of-authority controversies reveal a characteristic 
uncertainty that occurs in Central European parliamentary systems. The President is 
frequently in political conflict with the Prime Minister. Formal power and actual power may 
differ: the President may expand his authority as “the guardian of the Constitution”. 
14 Lipset, S. M.–Lakin, J. M.: The Democratic Century. Norman, 2004, 38–48.
15 Lech Garlicki, L.: Democracy and International Influences. In. Nolte, G. (ed.): European and 
U.S. Constitutionalism. Cambridge, 2005, 264.
16 Following a constitutional change in 1999, the Slovak president was no longer elected by the 
parliament, instead by popular vote. However, the Slovak Republic did not change to presidentialism.
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Vindicating real power as the head of state and the depository of national sovereignty 
sometimes leads to theatrical struggles.17
In the early years of new democracies, serious conflicts emerged between presidents 
and prime ministers over appointment-related issues. The first President of Hungary disputed 
with the Prime Minister over the competences of the President as commander in chief of the 
armed forces. The Constitutional Court interpreted the president’s power restrictively, 
defining that the constitution clearly provided a pure parliamentary system and the 
Government was the sole executive branch.18 When the Hungarian President refused to sign 
the dismissal of the chairman of National Television initiated by the Prime Minister, the 
Constitutional Court tailored the President’s right of refusal to appoint extremely narrowly. 
According to its reasoning, the President of the Republic “stands outside the executive 
power” and “no construction may be derived from the Constitution according to which the 
Government and the President of the Republic jointly head the executive branch, making 
consensus-based decisions in a mutually limiting and counterbalancing manner”.19 During a 
similar so-called media war, Polish President Walesa dismissed the chairman of the 
Committee for the Supervision over Radio and Television. The ombudsman challenged his 
decision. The Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the President could not dismiss the 
chairman, except for a judicially established violation of law.20 The Slovak Prime Minister 
Mečiar asked President Kováč to discharge the foreign minister. Kováč refused and asked 
the Constitutional Court whether he was required by the Constitution to obey the Prime 
Minister’s request. The Court ruled in its highly criticised decision that the President was 
not obliged to comply with the Prime Minister’s request only to consider it.21
In recent years “chair wars” between prime ministers and presidents have been 
commonplace. The most decisive issues have been the following: who represents the 
country abroad and who represents the country’s position in the European Union. In the 
past three years–following the short co-government of the Kaczyński twins22–Polish 
President Lech Kaczyński and Prime Minister Donald Tusk engaged in endless contention 
over the competences. It seems that the Czech President, Vaclav Klaus also wants to 
represent the State’s authority in several subject matters. It is noteworthy that the Czech and 
Polish Presidents were the last two obstacles standing in the way of the EU Lisbon Treaty. 
Kaczyński signed the reform treaty into law only after Poland had won a United Kingdom-
style opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights by a protocol to the treaty.23 Klaus 
17 Dorsen, N.–Rosenfeld, M.–Sajó, A.–Baer, S.: Comparative Constitutionalism. Cases and 
Materials. St. Paul (MN), 2003, 269.
18 Decision 48/1991. See Sólyom–Brunner (eds): Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy: 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court. op. cit. 159.
19 Decision 36/1992. See Dorsen–Rosenfeld–Sajó–Baer (eds): Comparative Constitutionalism. 
op. cit. 268.
20 Decision 7/1994. See ibid. 271.
21 Resolution 39/93. (Jun 2, 1992.) See Schwartz, H.: The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in 
Post-Communist Europe. Chicago, 2000, 202.
22 From July 2006 to November 2007 President Lech Kaczyński’s identical twin brother, 
Jarosław Kaczyński served as Prime Minister.
23 The Art. 1(1) of the protocol precludes both the domestic courts in Poland and the United 
Kingdom, and the EU courts from finding that “laws, regulations or administrative provisions, 
practices or action” in the countries to which it applies are inconsistent with the Charter. Art. 1(2) says 
that the Title IV of the Charter, which contains economic and social right does not create judicially 
enforceable rights.
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also insisted such a preference and demanded an exemption to prevent German families 
expelled after the Second World War from lodging property claims with the European Court 
of Justice. Eventually, EU leaders promised to amend the protocol so that it would apply to 
the Czech Republic, and subsequently the Czech Constitutional Court raised no objections, 
so Klaus also signed the treaty.24
At the same time, it can be seen that these kinds of debate often result in correct 
conclusions. The Czech and the Polish Prime Ministers frequently refrain from any attempt 
to bypass the President, so as to avoid a constitutional crisis. In addition, these conflicts 
make it clear that in a parliamentary system it is the prime minister and the cabinet that 
define the state’s position in EU and foreign-related matters. This means that the president 
could present the state’s position at the international level only when authorized to do so by 
the prime minister and according to the cabinet and parliament’s instructions. This solution 
comes from the text of the Czech and the Slovak Constitution, and, interestingly, Polish 
political and constitutional practice is moving toward this direction, too. (The Constitution 
of Poland does not contain this modification, because in 2009 the parties were not able to 
reach a consensus on this matter.) 
However, it seems to me that Hungary is the only one country among the members of 
the Visegrád Group, which is moving in the opposite direction. László Sólyom, the President 
of the Republic did not intend to award the former Prime Minister on the recommendation 
of the current head of the Government in 2007. Therefore the President filed a petition with 
the Constitutional Court seeking the abstract interpretation of the Constitution. In his 
opinion “the moral integrity of the Head of State may be jeopardized if he is not given true 
discretionary powers in making a decision under his powers following from the 
Constitution”. The President was convinced that his decision on recommendation for an 
award was a purely moral issue and represents solely a value judgment. Thus, the President 
might assert the constitutional values in accordance with his own moral integrity. In its 
decision the Constitutional Court ruled: “the President of the Republic has actual 
discretionary powers in conferring orders and awards… In case of a recommendation for an 
award that violates the constitutional values of the Republic of Hungary, it is the right of the 
President not to sign the recommendation, refusing to confer the award. Therefore, the 
refusal to confer an award… protects in this case the constitutional values of the Republic 
of Hungary.”25
As a result of the decision the President refused to confer the award on the former 
Prime Minister because the latter had not changed his views on the 1956 revolution, in 
which he had fought against the rebels. Simultaneously, the President was about to widen 
his competencies. The head of the state began to represent an alternative government 
program: he launched his own foreign policy, engaged in conflicts with neighbouring 
countries, and strongly criticised the Government’s economic policy. Last year the President 
de facto jeopardised the legislature by persistently returning Acts to Parliament for 
reconsideration and proposing preliminary norm control at the Constitutional Court. 
Currently, such authoritarian aspirations enjoy remarkable popularity in Hungary. It is 
widely believed that a wise statesman can be a better lawmaker than the disgraceful 
24 The protocol Klaus requested has no direct connection with the claims of the expelled 
Germans.
25 Decision 47/2007.
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Parliament, and this national leader should be the guardian of the Constitution instead of 
the unfamiliar Constitutional Court.26
Of course, this brief survey of the features of parliamentary systems and presidential 
aspirations in Central Europe is by no means exhaustive. Moreover, executive–legislative 
relations are more complex than a simple choice between a presidential and a parliamentary 
system.27 Two conclusions, however, seems clear. First, when president and prime minister 
jointly head the executive branch, their decision-making in a mutually limiting and 
counterbalancing manner might jeopardise the functioning government.28 Second, when a 
popular head of the state gains concentrated power, this might endanger the values and 
principles of constitutional democracy and tend to authoritarianism. In spite of the 
achievements of the first democratically elected, charismatic presidents, such as Havel and 
Wałęsa, dignified heads of the state with effective power may imperil democracy. Just like 
the lessons learnt from the region’s earlier history, these recent examples also illustrate that 
under Central European societal circumstances a parliamentary regime could be better than 
a presidential one.
2. Church privileges
The future of the European political communities depends to a great extent on their ability 
to cope with religious challenges. Simply put, one of the two difficulties is to find the proper 
place for Christian values within secularised constitutional democracies. Some strongly 
warn about the growing influence of religious fundamentalism and suggest an exclusion of 
the non-secular considerations from the public discourse.29 The other challenge Europe is 
facing now is how to effectively ensure equal rights and social cohesion for Muslim 
communities and individuals. As a result of terror attacks in some metropolises and the 
long-standing economic crisis, a worrying anti-Muslim trend has been developing in 
Western European countries.
Since the number of Muslims is much lower in Central Europe than in the West, the 
issue of the Christian values and a secular state plays a greater role in the constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Visegrád Countries. Examining closely only the text of the constitutions, 
we may assume that with the exception of Poland, the various religious organisations have 
equal status and people with different beliefs or conscience are treated as equals. Below, I 
demonstrate that the way judges apply the constitution does not depend on the text but 
rather on culturally and historically predetermined premises. In spite of the textual 
26 President Sólyom also had conflicts with the subsequent government. This is why he was not 
re-elected by the new parliamentary majority. The current prime minister has the ambition to be “the 
leader of the nation”. It seems likely that the Constitution will be reshaped soon in accordance with 
these presidential aspirations.
27 Shugart, M. S.: Of Presidents and Parliaments. East European Constitutional Review, 2 
(1993) 1, 30.
28 This is also the case in Romania and Ukraine.
29 See for example the dispute between András Sajó and Lorenzo Zucca on the growing claims 
of religions and the position of the secular state. Sajó, A.: Preliminaries to a concept of constitutional 
secularism. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 6 (2008) 3–4, 605–629. Zucca, L.: The crisis 
of the secular state–A reply to Professor Sajó. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 7 (2009) 
3, 494–514. Sajó, A.: The Crisis that was not there: Notes on a Reply. International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, 7 (2009) 3, 515–528. 
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differences, the Hungarian and the Polish constitutional case-law is similarly pro-Church 
and in some ways intolerant.
According to Wojciech Sadurski, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal is “the author of 
surely the most outrageously partisan and illiberal decisions of any constitutional court in 
the region”.30 The most infamous example is the 1997 decision concerning abortion. The 
Tribunal–by striking down a pro-choice statute–reintroduced a quasi-absolute ban on 
abortion issue. With this craven decision the Tribunal surrendered to the Church.31 It is 
noteworthy that the “Small Constitution” did not specifically include a right to life. The 
abortion ban and the rights of foetuses therefore were deduced from the abstract 
constitutional declaration that Poland is a democratic state under the rule of law.
The 1997 constitution seemingly advanced the interests of the Catholic Church. The 
preamble refers to a “culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation”. In Art. 18, 
marriage, as the union of a man and a woman, is granted the protection of the state. According 
to the Art. 25, the relations between Poland and the Catholic Church shall be determined by 
international treaty concluded with the Holy See. Under Art. 53, religious education and 
religious upbringing are protected. However, according to the preamble, “we the people” are 
“[b]oth those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, [a]s well as 
those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising from other 
sources”. The Preamble also declares that believers and non-believers are “equal in rights”. 
Art. 53 guarantees freedom of conscience to everyone. Art. 25 provides further protection, 
that public officials “shall be impartial in matters of personal conviction, whether religious 
or philosophical, or in relation to outlooks on life”. What is more, the relationship between 
the State and the churches shall be based not only “on the principle of cooperation”, but also 
“on the principle of respect for their autonomy and the mutual independence of each in its 
own sphere.” Thus, despite the reference to God and conventional morality, the constitution 
has not created a Catholic Poland as an alternative to a secular state.
Considering only the text of the constitution, Hungary can be classified as an ideal 
example of the secular constitutional democracy. The Free Exercise Clause reads: “In the 
Republic of Hungary everybody has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.” According to the Separation Principle “the church shall operate in separation from 
the state”. In contrast to the Polish constitution, this text does not refer to the Christian 
heritage or a treaty with the Holy See. Instead of state–church cooperation, it asserts only a 
strong separation principle.32
Despite these different constitutional guaranties, however, the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court often follows the ideas of historical churches by its conventionalist interpretation.33 
30 See Wojciech Sadurski’s Book Review on Herman Schwarz’s The struggle for constitutional 
justice in post-communist Europe. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 1(2003) 1, 162.
31 Schwartz, H.: The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe. Chicago, 
2000, 69.
32 Moreover, the historical circumstances are also different. While a great many people in the 
Polish Church made enormous contributions to the victory of democracy in Poland, the Hungarian 
churches remained inactive during the transition. See, for example, Michnik, A.: Church and State in 
Eastern Europe.The Clean Conscience Trap. East European Constitutional Review, Volume 7 (1998) 
2, 67–74.
33 For a detailed analysis of the following case-list see Tóth, G. A.: Unequal Protection: 
Historical Churches and Roma People in the Hungarian Constitutional Jurisprudence. Acta Juridica 
Hungarica, 51 (2010) 2, 122–135. 
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Although the abortion case struck down the quite liberal decree only on formal grounds 
(basic rights shall be regulated by an Act of Parliament), the reasoning emphasized that the 
legislature might extend the right to life and dignity to the foetus. In such a case, the abortion 
would be possible only if it was required to save the mother’s life. “The nature of such an 
extension (…) is comparable only to the abolition of slavery, but it surpasses even that 
event in significance.”34
In the Hungarian case law not only is homosexual marriage declared to be contrary to 
the Constitution, but the Court also hindered the introduction of the registered partnership 
of homosexual as well as heterosexual couples. Mainly historical churches objected the 
2008 Act on Registered Partnership. The judgment that accepted the churches’ conventional 
approach was passed before the given statute had come into force.35
According to the Court, “treating the churches equally does not exclude taking the 
actual social roles of the individual churches into account”. The judgment on church status 
explicitly provided preferential treatment for historical churches vis-à-vis other religious 
communities.36 Based upon this consideration, the Court found a decree on army chaplain 
service providing for the free exercise of religion and spiritual care only for members of the 
four historical churches (Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran, Jewish) to be constitutional.37
Numerous cases ended with an exceptionally favourable financial outcome for 
historical churches. The Court declared it constitutional that churches are exempted from 
the general statutory ban on acquiring soil. Since 1997, “positive discrimination” has to be 
secured for church-run schools as compared with public education institutions run by 
foundations or associations. According to this decision, only church-run schools have the 
right to the auxiliary subsidy above the normative state allowance. In 2007 this preferential 
34 It was not the Constitutional Court but the Parliament that reintroduced a quite pro-choice 
regulation. For the Decision 64/1991 see Sólyom–Brunner (eds): Constitutional Judiciary in a New 
Democracy: The Hungarian Constitutional Court. op. cit. 178.
35 Decision 154/2008. In terms of heterosexuals the judges found it unacceptable that the statute 
did not separate adequately the status of registered partnership from the institution of marriage. As for 
homosexual couples, the judgment implicitly established the category of separate and unequal. Even 
though the decision theoretically acknowledged that the registered partnership of homosexuals is not 
unconstitutional, it did not uphold the reviewed regulation. Apart from the fact that homosexual 
couples may not get married, when it comes to regulating their registered partnership “the differences 
flowing from the nature” of such relationships and marriage must be maintained. This means that in 
Hungarian constitutional practice the reasons for equal treatment must be shown, not that there is a 
compelling interest in unequal treatment. After the ruling the Parliament passed a restricted version of 
the Act on Registered Partnership. As a result registered same sex partnership has become a legal 
option in Hungary. The Court upheld it in its Decision 32/2010.
36 In the Czech Republic a 2002 Act created a two-tiered system of registration for religious 
organisations. To register at the first tier, a church must have at least 300 adult members residing in 
the country. In order to register at the second tier, the church must have existed for at least 10 years 
and must have a membership equal at least 0.1 per cent of the population. Second-tier registration 
entitles the church to a share of state funding as well as allowing the clergies to perform an officially 
recognized marriage ceremony and serve as an army-chaplain. Muslims have not been granted these 
privileges. See Pajas, P.: The Impact of the New Czech Law on Churches. The International Journal 
of Non-for-Profit Law, 6 (2003) 1. http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol6iss1/special_6.htm
37 According to Kis, this judgment would hardly survive the test either of the separation principle 
or that of the religious neutrality of the state and of the abolition of religious discrimination. Kis, J.: 
Constitutional Democracy. op. cit. 282.
230 GáBOR ATTILA TóTH
financial treatment was extended to the social and welfare activities of the churches, in 
contrast to those humanist institutions that are not affiliated with churches. In 2008 the 
judges, by referring to the Treaty concluded between the Republic of Hungary and the Holy 
See, demanded that Catholic schools and public education institutions run by the state or 
municipalities be financed to exactly the same degree.
The above-mentioned cases illustrate that the interpretative practice of state–church 
cooperation strengthened the old privileges of historical churches. Moreover, by using the 
concept in the wrong way, the exceptional treatment falls within the ambit of constitutionally 
justifiable preferential treatment. From the perspective of constitutional interpretation, the 
judges accepted the premise that historical churches have notable social weight, and that 
they have an outstanding role in the field of spiritual care, and also socially and culturally. 
At the same time, through their decisions they influenced communal practice in such a way 
that historical churches were granted exceptionally favourable conditions for their spiritual 
and other activities. This type of traditionalism supports maintaining tradition even if it 
violates the principle of equality.
3. Ethnic discrimination
One of the most difficult issues of constitutional theory and practice concerns the equal 
protection of ethnic minorities. Political and constitutional debates regarding the rights of 
old and new minorities are a familiar feature of Western democracies. Old minorities are 
long settled within a particular territory and not those people but the state borders have 
moved. Conversely, new minorities, who face a more unfavourable social and legal 
environment, are immigrants, asylum seekers and guest workers.
The countries of Visegrád Group are not the preferred destinations of immigrants. 
However, a number of conflicts involving old minorities have emerged in the last two 
decades. Although ethnic violence did not undermine the transition to a constitutional 
democracy, nationalist tendencies and ethnic exclusions cause serious tensions among the 
population. In place of a comprehensive examination I describe just the tip of the iceberg.
More than ten million Roma people live in the European Union. No ethnic group in 
Europe suffers more social exclusion, worse discrimination and greater poverty. Roma are 
divided into a number of distinct populations; the largest and still growing part of them live 
in Central and Eastern Europe. By 2030, sixteen percent of Slovakia’s under-eighteens will 
be Roma, according to a study by the Open Society Foundation Bratislava. The European 
Commission estimates that by 2040, forty percent of the new entrants onto Hungary’s labour 
market will be Roma. The political and social conditions for Roma are worsening in Central 
Europe: the past years have seen an expansion in racist attacks of families, with homes set 
on fire as well as forced evictions and the building of walls around settlements.
However, for the most part, national authorities have felt little compulsion to help this 
most marginalised group. What is more, the new Hungarian Government–copying the 
Italian administration–proclaimed Roma to have become a national law and order problem. 
As a consequence, they are the target not only of increasing public hostility but also of 
special police measures and discriminatory criminal sanctions. In some countries, policies 
even add to discrimination and segregation: despite decades of calls for change, Roma 
children are still being segregated in schools and often placed in “special schools” with sub-
standard education. 
Direct or indirect discrimination against ethnic minorities is evidently a constitutional 
issue. The Constitutions of the Central European countries ensure the fundamental rights 
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for all persons on their territory without discrimination on the basis of race, colour, national 
or social origins. In accordance with this, national statutory laws prohibit discrimination 
in such areas as employment, housing, voting rights, education, and access to public 
facilities. Furthermore, all Constitutions explicitly protect ethnic minorities. (Besides the 
antidiscrimination principle, the Hungarian Constitution also provides for the principle of 
preferential treatment.) It is a common feature of the basic texts that the equality principle 
derives from the constitutional value of human dignity. The Hungarian Constitutional Court 
echoed the Dworkinian conception: “The prohibition of discrimination means all people 
must be treated as equal (as persons with equal dignity) by law–i.e. the fundamental right to 
human dignity may not be impaired, and the criteria for the distribution of the entitlements 
and benefits shall be determined with the same respect and prudence, and with the same 
degree of consideration of individual interests.”38 
Constitutions contain principles and general rules of institutions and human rights. Of 
course, Roma as an ethnic group cannot be seen in the text. But the question arises whether 
the courts or other authorities can apply the constitutions independently from the historical 
background and the community practice. Could the courts fulfil their task by examining 
nothing but the text and an individual complaint? According to some Constitutional Courts, 
the answer is yes. In the light of the leading case of the European Court of Human Rights, 
the answer is no.
In the case of D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic39 eighteen Czech nationals of 
Roma origin alleged that, as a result of their ethnic origin, they were assigned to special 
primary schools for children with learning difficulties. They argued that the placement in 
special schools amounted to a general practice that had resulted in segregation and racial 
discrimination through the coexistence of two educational systems, namely special schools 
for the Roma and ordinary schools for the majority of the population. Previously the Czech 
Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal partly on the ground that “there was 
nothing in the material before it to show that the relevant statutory provisions had been 
interpreted or applied unconstitutionally” and partly on the ground that it was not the 
Constitutional Court’s role “to assess the overall social context”.40
In contrast, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights examined the 
empirical basis for and the historical background of the segregated school-system. It 
observed, for example, that the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance had 
noted that the channelling of Roma children into special schools for the mentally retarded 
was reportedly often “quasi-automatic”. According to data collected from several 
independent bodies more than half of all Roma children in the Czech Republic–and 
specifically in the hometown of the applicants–attended special schools.41 This evidence 
proved to be sufficiently reliable and significant to give rise to a strong presumption of 
indirect discrimination. In these circumstances the Court was not satisfied that the difference 
in treatment between Roma and non-Roma children was objectively and reasonably justified. 
38 Decision 9/1990. See Sólyom–Brunner (eds): Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy: 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court. op. cit. 111.
39 D. H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, Judgment of 13 November 2007. 
40 Decision I. US 297/99.
41 In 1999, 56 per cent of all pupils placed in special schools in Ostrava were Roma. Conversely, 
Roma represented only 2.26 per cent of the total number of pupils attending primary school in Ostrava. 
See D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, para 190.
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As a consequence the Court held that the applicants as members of that community had 
necessarily suffered the same discriminatory treatment.42
In the case of D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic the Court graciously noted that 
the Czech Republic is not alone in having encountered difficulties in providing schooling 
for Roma children and, unlike some countries, it has sought to tackle the problem.43 The 
jurisdiction of the Czech Constitutional Court is certainly not exceptional.44 It is well known 
that in Hungary many hundred thousands of Roma face social difficulties, prejudice and 
segregation.45 However, if one wants to be informed by the constitutional case law, it is 
easy to overlook the fact that a part of the citizens is Roma.46 This is so since the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court has not openly addressed the problems affecting Roma. From the first 
decade of constitutional review, it can be reconstructed from one of the decisions regarding 
compensation that, during the Second World War, similarly to Jews, Roma were also 
deported. Apart from this, the court never referred to the Roma in an explicit manner. Here 
are some examples of the case-law: the judges upheld a local government decree declaring 
those Roma people who do not fit into the life of the community persona non grata; they 
concluded that it was not unconstitutional that Hungarian law did not demand equal 
treatment from private organizations acting in the public sphere; they did not deal with the 
unfair treatment of Roma squatters, in spite of the joint motion of the Parliamentary 
Ombudspersons for Civil Rights and for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities; they 
refrained from reflecting social reality when examining the anti-Roma local governmental 
resolutions revoking social allowances; they referred to U.S. governmental abuses rather 
than Hungarian (or Czech or Slovak) malpractice in connection with coercive sterilization.47 
42 Previously a Chamber of the Court composed of seven judges held that there had been no 
violation of the Convention. Goodwin, M.: D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic: a major set-back for 
the development of non-discrimination norms in Europe. German Law Journal, 7 (2006) 4, 421–431.
43 But see Siklova, J.–Miklusakova, M.: Denying Citizenship to the Czech Roma. East European 
Constitutional Review, 7 (1998) 2, 58–64. 
44 See also the case of Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, Judgment of 16 March, 2010, which upheld 
the precedent of the D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic. The Constitutional Court of Croatia 
had dismissed the applicants’ constitutional complaint on similar grounds than the Czech court. 
Subsequently the Government of the Slovak (!) Republic intervened as a third party in the European 
Court of Human Rights’ proceedings. It referred to the margin of appreciation afforded to the States in 
the sphere of education and stressed that the States should not be prohibited from setting up separate 
classes at different types of school for children with difficulties, or from implementing special 
educational programmes to respond to special needs.
45 See, for example, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance’s latest report on 
Hungary. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-Country/Hungary/HUN-CbC-IV-
2009-003-ENG.pdf
46 For detailed analysis of the following case-list see Tóth, G. A.: Unequal Protection: Historical 
Churches and Roma People in the Hungarian Constitutional Jurisprudence. op. cit.
47 Decision 43/2005. In reality, like in the Slovak and Czech cases, Hungarian Roma women are 
among the victims. For example, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Woman 
held that the State had violated a Roma woman’s fundamental rights by performing the sterilization 
surgery without obtaining her informed consent. (CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2004.) A 2005 report by the 
Czech ombudsman identified dozens of cases of coercive sterilization between 1979 and 2001. See 
also, Body and Soul, Forced Sterilization and Other Assaults on Roma Reproductive Freedom in 
Slovakia (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2003).
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In sum, the taboo in Roma cases has not been broken yet. For two decades the problems 
relating to the exclusion and discrimination of Roma have remained hidden.48
Due to lack of space, I cannot deal with other constitutional aspects of Central European 
ethnic tensions. In general, the stronger a nation-building policy is, the more the Roma 
people suffer from discrimination. For example, the current legislative and governmental 
measures driven by nationalism in Hungary and Slovakia sometimes go hand in hand with 
anti-Roma actions. Recently the Hungarian parliamentary majority has reshaped the 
citizenship law, which represents an old-fashioned nation-state policy based upon language, 
culture and ethnicity rather than equality of all citizens, regardless of ethnicity.49
While, on the one hand, Central European Constitutions affirm the principle of non-
discrimination and contain specific clauses for minority protection, on the other hand, the 
constitutional culture tends to provide room only for those who belong to the ethnic 
majority.
III. Conclusions
For two decades the Central European countries have been part of the group of constitutional 
democracies. In spite of uneasy political compromises, the coordinated transition resulted 
in revolutionary outcomes. Since international human rights instruments and Western 
constitutions influenced the texts of the constitutions, the reshaped constitutional systems 
do not hinder political communities from realising the full promise of democracy. In this 
respect the transition is unquestionably a success.
From Poland to Hungary, every Visegrád Country established its own parliamentary 
system. They created judicial institutions, in the form of constitutional courts, in order to 
enforce the principles and rights recognised by the constitutions. Numerous examples 
demonstrate that neither the parliaments nor the courts have been able to retain the last 
word as to constitutional adjudication. The meaning of the constitution is constructed 
through an institutional dialogue between elected officials and judges.
The achievement of these relatively new constitutional democracies depends 
significantly on extra textual factors, notably political and interpretive practices. The record 
of constitutional courts and other actors in defence of constitutional values is far from 
unambiguously positive. This paper has focused particularly on the constitutional issues 
of presidential aspirations, church privileges and ethnic discrimination. Of course, any 
selection of examples intended to illustrate a broader phenomenon is inevitably somewhat 
arbitrary. The differences among these countries certainly should not be ignored. Yet some 
concluding remarks seem in order.
48 Kriszta Kovács shows that the Hungarian Constitutional Court has never declared 
unconstitutionality based upon suspect classification. It found, for example, that the victims of gender-
based discrimination are mostly men. Kovács, K.: Think Positive, Preferential Treatment in Hungary. 
Fundamentum, Human Rights Quarterly, 5 (2008), 46, 48.
49 Hungary passed a law this year granting dual citizenship to Hungarians living abroad. 
Citizenship will be awarded to those who can prove their knowledge of the Hungarian language and 
claim Hungarian ancestry. The new bill has inflamed tensions with Slovakia, home of 500,000 ethnic 
Hungarians who comprise more than ten per cent of the country’s population. The Slovak Parliament 
immediately passed a law in order to pose an obstacle the dual citizenship. Previously, the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court ruled that it would not violate the non-discrimination clause of the Constitution 
or any international legal obligations if Parliament passed a law offering preferential naturalization 
that granted Hungarian citizenship–on request–to persons who claim Hungarian ethnicity but do not 
reside in Hungary. Decision 5/2004.
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The words of a constitution are connected to an existing political community. The 
scope-of-authority conflicts between Central European presidents and prime ministers 
represent an uncertainty in constitutional interpretation not necessarily inherent in the 
written regulations. The constitutional status of a president can be changed without 
amending the constitution. As the recent controversies show, the main political actors, first 
and foremost the presidents, often misinterpret their competences. 
Constitutional design and case-law are part of a larger social and political process. The 
choices of the interpreters determine to what extent social reality appears in judgments and to 
what conclusions it contributes. The privileges of historical churches are not based on the text 
of the constitutions so much as the churches’ hypothetical social role. When changing societal 
experiences conflict with the conventions, then the conventions are sometimes held to be 
stronger than reality. An empirical survey could be an effective method of mapping indirect 
discrimination and racism. However, while historical churches have become constitutional 
categories, Roma barely appear in the decisions. Besides adequate reflection on the social 
reality, the constitutional interpretation also requires moral evaluation. In the case of historical 
churches, the judges apply the concept of preferential treatment, but it is not clear what type 
of inequality can be found at the starting point. In contrast, in the case of Roma numerous 
studies forewarn of the extraordinary social consequences arising from inequality. 
According to the partnership view of democracy, people are full partners in a collective 
political enterprise, so that a majority’s decisions are democratic only when certain further 
conditions are met that protect the status and interest of each citizen.50 As a consequence, 
authoritarianism, prevailing ideology, historical privileges, and nationalism endanger 
democracy. In this respect, Hungary is currently in a depressing and dangerous period of its 
history. An empowered national leader seems to be an attractive constitutional alternative to 
the endless parliamentary debates. Paraphrasing the words of the Polish preamble, we can 
say that reference to God as the source of truth and justice in Hungary is more common 
than reference to those universal values as arising from other sources. These tendencies go 
hand in hand with a nation-state policy based upon national language, culture and ethnicity.
It is noteworthy that all Central European countries except for Hungary adopted a new 
constitution after the regime change. All of them preserved the values and institutions that 
had been established between 1989 and 1992.51 The most recent Hungarian Government–
having the required two-thirds parliamentary majority–has already announced that it will 
provide a new constitution for the country. In contrast to the other countries, the clear and 
present aim of the prospective Hungarian Founding Fathers is to repeal the 1989 established 
constitutional principles and institutions.
The future of Central European constitutional democracies relies not only on the 
actions of people in the countries concerned but also on the commitment of Western 
societies. In the long run, the Visegrád Countries are not able to ignore the achievements of 
the modern constitutionalism. This is why so important even from Eastern point of view 
that Western democracies are able to cope with the unpopularity of representative bodies, to 
find the proper place of religious values within secularised democracies, and to ensure equal 
protection of law to ethnic minorities. 
50 Dworkin, R.: Justice in Robes. Cambridge (MA), 2006. 134, 139.
51 The current Polish preamble expresses that in 1989 the Homeland recovered and regained the 
possibility of a sovereign and democratic determination of its fate.
